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Abstract
There is little discussion in the literature about trade intermediaries
because data is rare. Using very original data, our article sheds light on the
behavior of trade intermediaries when importing fresh fruit and vegetables
in France. To do so, we distinguish among direct and indirect imports
respectively operated through brokers or retailers. We then investigate the
impact of country level data on the share of indirect/direct ￿ ows of imports
by country of origin at the 8-digit level that enter the french market. We
show that brokers are more likely to operate in context when ￿xed and
variable costs to trade are high whereas retailers are sensitive to tari⁄s and
product sensitivity.
JEL codes: Q17
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11 Introduction
In response to recent food scares, countries have strengthened their food safety
standards and their oversight. In the US, safety risks associated with the consump-
tion of domestic and imported seafood motivated the introduction of a mandatory
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) in 1997 (Anders & Caswell,
2009). In the same time, private standards have been developed and proliferated,
operating alongside public standards to guarantee food quality and/or safety. This
has resulted in an increasingly complex network where both public and private
standards take prominent role in global food markets and thus in international
trade in regulating food product quality and safety. Those private standards have
been ￿rstly developed by retailers in order to comply with new regulations and to
reinforce their mission of gatekeepers and guarantor of product quality. Private
standards are the most well developed in the fresh produce industry, namely fruit
and vegetables with the GLOBAL-GAP scheme that has led to the adoption of
good agricultural practices in several countries (Henson et al.., 2010). As a conse-
quence voluntary private standards have in￿ uenced the whole supply chain. Many
scholars have focused on the impact of private standard on transformation of food
retailing particularly on producers in developing countries. This literature provides
much evidence that increased private food safety standards are appealing protec-
tionist tools and are generally considered to be barriers to trade that disadvantage
developing countries (Fulponi, 2006). The impact of private standards on the food
supply chain in developed countries has not been assessed yet. However, private
standards would also impact trade and food suppliers in developed countries. For
instance, private standards would be a new security for direct imports from for-
eign growers by retailers because they would reduce information asymmetries and
transactions costs (search and monitoring costs) as regards compliance to public
food quality standards. In the long run, indirect imports (through brokers) should
disappear because retailers would directly import produce for their own supply
chain.
In this paper, we consider the activity of importing in an active way focusing
on the agent who imports. We particularly shed light on the behavior of brokers
and retailers when importing fresh fruit and vegetables in France. From 1995 to
2005, we observe the persistence of agricultural imports (country of origin/product)
through French brokers which has led us to focus on their speci￿c role and to
highlight the di⁄erences between direct (through retailers) and indirect imports
(through brokers).
In the new new international economics literature, whereas exporting behavior
is well documented there is virtually no research analyzing the decision for ￿rms to
import. To our knowledge, the few existing theoretical and empirical articles have
mostly focused on the decision of exporters to rely or not on trade intermediaries
2(assumed as a technology) (Ahn et al., 2010; Antr￿s & Costinot, 2010). The more
productive the ￿rm, the least the need for intermediaries. We look at the ￿ ip side
of the coin focusing on the trade ￿ ows of fresh produce imported in France through
two identi￿ed channels, direct and indirect imports in France.
To do so, we ￿rst distinguish among direct and indirect imports respectively
operated through brokers or retailers. We stick on the de￿nition of trade interme-
diaries the business literature provides which refers to the ownership of products
(Spulber, 1996). Brokers who don￿ t buy any products are de￿ned as matchmakers.
Their economic activity represents the share of indirect imports. We show that
brokers are more likely to operate in context when ￿xed and variable costs to trade.
Then, we consider retailers that would directly imports products purchasing them
for their own supply chain to be distributed to consumers and highlight they are
sensitive to tari⁄s and product sensitivity to pesticides.
This article is organized as follows: The second section presents the related
literature on the activity of trade intermediaries and the reading done by the
new new international economics literature. In the third section we decribe data
and highlight empirical facts on the french trade of fresh produce. In the fourth
section, we highlight the impact of a set of country variables on the share of
imports for retailers (direct imports) and brokers (indirect imports). We provide
some conclusions in the last section.
2 Intermediaries in trade: Related literature
There are several strands of literature that have focused on the recourse of in-
termediaries or middlemen in transactions (the two terms have been used by au-
thors interchangeably). For some scholars, middlemen are more present in markets
where there is some lack of information between buyers and sellers. Rubinstein
& Wolinsky (1987) have explained that intermediaries act as matchmakers and
reduce transaction costs between buyers and sellers. They also act as "guarantor
of quality" or "experts" when it is di¢ cult to judge of the quality of the product
(Biglaiser, 1993; Biglaiser and Friedman, 1994). For Spulber (1996) the type of
information imperfection in the markets will determine the activities of the inter-
mediary: price setting and market clearing, providing liquidity and immediacy,
matching and searching or guaranteeing and monitoring. More recently, Antr￿s
and Costinot (2010) have developed a theoretical model of trade with the presence
of a technology of intermediation. They show that the presence of intermediaries
facilitates the realization of the gains from trade. Moreover, intermediaries can
gain advantages over direct exchanges by pooling and diversifying risk (Spulber,
1996). For Spulber (1996 intermediaries can be de￿ned as "an economic agent
who purchases from suppliers for resale or who helps sellers and buyers to meet
3and transact". Some authors as Hackett (1992) clearly identify two types of inter-
mediaries. On the one hand, matchmakers who never own the product and work
on a commission basis and, on the other hand, traders who are merchants. They
trade products for their own account. The de￿nition provided by those authors
converges and depends on the ownership of the product intermediaries deal with.
In the following, we use this de￿nition to distinguish among intermediaries. We
consider brokers who don￿ t buy any products and are de￿ned as matchmakers
whereas retailers will purchase product for their own supply chain to resale it to
consumers.
In the new new international economics literature, there is a burgeoning litera-
ture that explores the great role played by intermediaries in the trade process (see
Rauch, 2001; Feenstra & Hanson, 2004). Scholars mostly focus on the determi-
nants of the export mode chosen by ￿rms using ￿rm level data. Either ￿rms would
export directly or they would use an intermediary (Ahn et al., 2010; Blum et al.
2009). In Bernard et al (2010), intermediaries are non producing or consuming
￿rms and they are intermediaries of sales (Bernard et al., 2010). Bernard et al.
(2010) then compare manufacturers and intermediaries in all Italian sectors that
are respectively assumed to directly/indirectly export They show that ￿rms have
direct pro￿t according to the export mode they choose. Low productivity ￿rms
will choose the intermediation technology, the more productive ones will export
directly. The respective share of indirect vs direct export will depend on the ex-
port destination, as more productive ￿rms will be able to overcome high trade
cost. Ahn et al. (2010) modify a model of heterogenous ￿rm ￿ la "Melitz" by in-
troducing an intermediation technology. Firms￿choice to export would depend on
the characteristics of the destination country (size of the foreign country, cultural
distance, etc) and on their own characteristics, namely their productivity. The
least productive ￿rms would export using importers. The underlying hypothesis is
that ￿xed costs to export using intermediation technology are lower than the direct
exporting ￿xed costs. In their empirical setting they consider intermediary as all
Chinese ￿rms which have "trade" in their name and consider that exports that
pass through those ￿rms are indirect exports. Based on this assumption, they
show that exports via the intermediation technology will be larger in countries
with small market size, higher variable costs and higher ￿xed costs of exporting.
In others words, those studies have considered that the activity of intermediaries
had been maintained because of ￿rms that are less productive than ￿rms that
could directly export. However, results are di¢ cult to compare because none of
these papers use the same de￿nition of trade intermediaries (Bernard et al., 2010)
and they consider trade intermediaries as an homogeneous type.
In the following, we bring those two strands of literature together. On the one
hand, we will consider brokers who are ￿rms who do not buy the products they deal
4with. They are matchmakers and their share of imports would represent the share
of indirect imports. On the other hand, we will consider retailers (supermarkets)
who do buy product they will resale to retail them in their own supply chain. We
will consider their imports share as direct imports. This allows us to introduce
heterogeneity in the wide de￿nition of trade intermediaries at the product level in
the imports industry of fresh produce.
3 French fresh produce trade
In the following, we originally consider the import side of trade, and the role
of intermediaries (brokers vs. retailers) in importing fresh fruit and vegetable in
France. As we have already described, import ￿ ows of fruits and vegetables will be
di⁄erentiated between direct imports by retailers (intermediaries that sell directly
the products to consumers without any transformation1) and indirect imports by
brokers (intermediaries that never own the produce but who are matchmakers2).
3.1 Data
We have combined three dataset that allow us to provide valuable insights on
French direct/indirect import of fresh produce. First, we use french customs
dataset of imports that covers the period 1995-2005 and document all transac-
tions from foreign country to french ￿rms (since we focus on imports). For each
￿rm which has imported we have the annual value and volume of imports dis-
aggregated by country of origin at the 8-digit product level. Second, we must
distinguish between trade operators (￿rms with the main activity is to trade) and
other ￿rms that do import produce in French customs data (for instance manufac-
turers who transforms fresh produce). Using the identi￿cation of the ￿rm (SIREN)
we merge the customs dataset with the section "Trade" of the "Enquete Annuelle
d￿ Entreprises" that records economical informations for ￿rms (total sales, employ-
ees, etc.) for which "trade" is their general activity. At this step, our dataset
contains all the french ￿rms which import AND trade fresh produce. They are
trading ￿rms.
One step further is to distinguish among the di⁄erent types of fresh produce
trade intermediaries, that is brokers who do not buy the product and retailers
who buy and resale produce in their own supply chain. In other words, we must
distinguish among direct imports through retailers and indirect imports through
brokers. In the main dataset, we thus identify ￿rms which operate in the French
1We rule out of our sample all manufacturers since they are not at the core of our analysis.
2Brokers get a commission which is about (in average) 6 or 7% of the total value they import
in the French market.
5import industry of fresh produce as brokers and from which we have collected data
covering 100 ￿rms3 during the summer 2006. Brokers were asked questions, face-
to-face, about the ￿rm situation in 2005, and particularly about characteristics
such as total amount of sales, main produce, specialisation. We then identify the
90 ￿rms which concern "retailers supply chain".4
Our ￿nal dataset is thus made of the 190 French ￿rms who import fresh fruit
and vegetables in France. For all of those ￿rms we have the total volume and value
of fresh produce imported from 1995 until 2005 and their economic characteristics
(total sales, number of employees, value added) for the year 2005. For the year
2005, trade intermediaries (that is all the trading ￿rms) represent 58% of total
French imports of fresh fruits and vegetables (in value). Thus this category of
operator is signi￿cant in F&V french imports. Among them, brokers and retailers
(i.e. 190 identi￿ed ￿rms) represent 64% of value made by trade intermediaries
(1063 ￿rms) and 37% of whole French imports (still in value) whereas others trad-
ing ￿rms (873 ￿rms) than brokers and retailers represent 21% of the total value of
imports.
An important characteristics of fresh fruit and vegetables is that these products
are very sensitive to pesticides. In order to take into account this sensitivity of
fresh produce, we refer to the list of the most sensitive products to pesticides pub-
lished by the Environmental Working Group (http://www.ewg.org/ ). According
to this list, we are able to classify fruit and vegetables according to their sensi-
tivity to pesticides. According to the list provided by the EWP, we distinguish
three classes: 13 most sensitive products (tomatoes, strawberries), 14 less sensitive
(onions, mangos) and all others that we have considered as sensitive.
3.2 Empirical facts
As we have noticed in the introduction, the development of private standards,
mostly imposed by supermarkets in the fresh produce industry, could have led
brokers activity to disappear from the economic activity because private standards
would have reduced the asymmetry of information on produce between producers
and retailers. Private standard would have act as a security between growers and
retailers weakening the need of borkers as "guarantor of quality" as suggested by
Biglaiser (1993).
From Graph 1 and Graph 2, we can observe that brokers are more likely to im-
port products from countries outside of the EU whereas retailers would more likely
to directly import product for the EU countries. We can also observe that brokers￿
3The survey gathers data on almost all brokers located in the Perpignan and Rungis market
which are the main imports market of fresh fruits and vegetables in France.
4We have compiled data from ￿rms with the French APE code (main activity) 511P, 521D,
521F.
6share in the EU is decreasing between 1995 and 2005 whereas they maintain their



























Graph 2: Imports from non-EU by trade intermediaries.
To deepen this observation, we have considered the share of the 1995 and 2005
total french imports directly imported by supermarkets and by brokers from the
13 most important exporter countries of fresh produce in value (Table 1, Table 2).
We can observe that brokers mostly import products from less developed coun-
tries than retailers (on the basis of the Human Development Index provided by
the UN). Moreover from Table 1 and Table 2 we observe that importers cannot
be ignored in ￿ ows of fresh produce imported from South Africa (66% in 2005),
Israel (98% in 2005) or Ivory Coast (86% en 1995; 91% en 2005).
7Country HDI (1995) Total Tde Intrm (%) Retailer(%) Broker (%)
Spain 0.914 1066671 571475.2 (54%) 40679.02 (7%) 426840.9 (75%)
Belgium 0.933 275006.4 77139.32 (28%) 22293.73 (29%) 4964 (6%)
Morocco 0.562 239921.9 68943.82 (29%) 400.89 (1%) 48280.54 (70%)
Netherlands 0.938 220321.5 77840.11 (35%) 17381.59 (22%) 10207.99 (13%)
Italy 0.906 220158.2 77319.76 (35%) 4143.41 (5%) 34200.16 (44%)
Ivory Coast 0.456 146381 60195.45 (41%) 2422.06 (4%) 52041.95 (86%)
United States 0.939 113731.4 50408.31 (44%) 1638.38 (3%) 10823.91 (21%)
Turkey 0.730 91709.04 32540.21 (35%) 39.15 (0%) 6033.993 (19%)
Israel 0.883 91135.65 56558.4 (62%) 109.68 (0%) 54346.96 (96%)
South Africa 0.688 (2000) 86877.43 69169.14 (80%) 19.64 (0%) 67287.82 (97%)
Cameroon 0.520 85568.88 32652.69 (38%) 0 (0%) 1251.4 (4%)
Germany 0.919 52988.67 20467.95 (39%) 5695.226 (28%) 8169.638 (40%)
Argentina 0.824 51584.5 25200.44 (49%) 114.75 (0%) 15685.32 (62%)
Chile 0.822 48731.44 19384.71 (40%) 444.48 (2%) 10960.6 (57%)
Table 1: Imports from trade intermediaries by country of origin in 1995
Country HDI (2005) Total Tde Intrm (%). Retailer( %) Broker (%)
Spain 0.949 1642837 1141502 (69%) 283435 (25%) 585651 (51%)
Morocco 0.640 441552.2 270606.7 (61%) 7543 (3%) 241550.8 (89%)
Belgium 0.947 361464.8 193433.6(54%) 43614 (23%) 5193,238 (3%)
Italy 0.947 302102.2 161024.6 (53%) 18985 (12%) 43150 (27%)
Netherlands 0.958 269452.4 141932.3 (53%) 48447.86 (34%) 9532 (7%)
Israel 0.929 223405.1 208287 (93%) 850.478 (0%) 204519.6 (98%)
United States 0.955 184070.5 67070.3 (36%) 14.686 (0%) 8544 (13%)
Ivory Coast 0.480 168858.8 118986.2 (70%) 1316.506 (1%) 107887 (91%)
Turkey 0.796 105385.8 57646 (55%) 398.215 (1%) 6692 (12%)
South Africa 0.678 98551.3 68407 (69%) 2678 (4%) 45264 (66%)
Germany 0.942 88859.77 48478 (55%) 16184 (33%) 4622 (10%)
Argentina 0.855 67010.5 51803 (77%) 6524 (13%) 28654 (55%)
Chile 0.872 67691.09 51803 (61%) 1499 (4%) 20210 (49%)
Table 2: Imports from trade intermediaries by country of origin in 2005
As suggested by Graph 1, supermarkets are dominant in ￿ ows of produce that
come from Europe (In 2005: Belgium 23%, the Netherlands 22% and Germany
33%). Table 1 shows that imports from Spain and Morocco are mostly dominated
by brokers. However, we observe that the share of retailers in the ￿ ow of produce
from Spain is about 25% in 2005 but they do not directly import produce from
Morocco whereas the two countries exports more or less similar produce and they
are not too far away one from each other. In 2005, ￿ ows from Morocco are mostly
8captured by brokers whom represent 90% of the total value. In the same way,
we have considered the product sensitivity e⁄ect when considering either brokers
or retailers. In 1995, brokers imported 70,56% of the value of the whole set of
products sensitive to pesticides. In 2005, the share of sensitive products imported
by them was of 59,50%. The share of sensitive products imported by retailers was
respectively of 7,76% of value in 1995 and 8,15% in 2005.
Descriptive statistics show us a persistence of some agricultural imports through
French brokers but for particular product from particular country. Taking note
of this allows us to hypothesize a speci￿c role for brokers: they act as a ￿lter to
enter the French market and would support some kind of risk directly link to the
product imported and the country of origin.
4 Intermediation in trade of fresh produce: econo-
metric analysis
In section 3, we have shown that brokers di⁄er from retailers in terms of country of
origin, regions and product. In this section, we investigate the impact of country
level data on the share (in value) of imports by country of origin at the 8-digit
level that enter the French market through brokers or retailers.
We follow the speci￿cation of Ahn et al. (2010) to study the share of interme-
diaries in French imports ￿ ows. The estimated equation is
s
Fj




k + "ik (1)
with s
Fj
ik the share in French imports of intermediaries j from country i in
product k (8 digit level) ; j represents either brokers or retailers. The variables
Xi describes the country of origin of the product, and Xk describes the products
(especially the sensibility to pesticides of the product). We integrate a product-
level ￿xed e⁄ect.
We regress the share of brokers and retailers for each product-country pair
on the four usual gravity variables to proxy for market size and variable and ￿xed
costs of trade (in log): GDP, distance, the number of documents to export from the
country of origin and tari⁄s. As usual, we use the standard variables the gravity
literature provides. Total GDP id from the World Bank and approximate market
size and geographical distance approximate transportation costs. We use tari⁄s
applied by France to country of origin at the 8 digit level. This data is available
from the TARIC database. As suggested by Ahn et al. (2010) and Bernard et al.
(2010) we approximate the country-level ￿xed costs using the number of documents
for exporting from a country of origin and that is available from the World Bank
Doing Business dataset. Speci￿c to this study, we have also added a product
9e⁄ect, considering if the product imported is sensitive or not to pesticides. Table
3 reports the econometrics results using a product-level ￿xed e⁄ects estimator.
Brokers Retailers
Constant 0.0488 (0.361) 0.25 (0.379)
Log GDP -0.026**(0.010) 0.002 (0.011)
Log applied tariff 0.056*** (0.016) 0.081*** (0.018)
Log distance 0.064*** (0.017) 0.007 (0.019)
Log number of documents to export from origin
country 0.144** (0.067) 0.046 (0.078)
Level 1 Ref. Ref.
Level 2 0.018 (0.046) -0.092* (0.048)
Level 3 0.032 (0.047) -0.083* (0.08)
Product fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of observation 700 928
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.09
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Product sensitivity
Country characteristics
Table 3: Determinants of the imports share of brokers and retailers in 2005
For brokers, import share is declining in log GDP. Products from small markets
are more likely to enter the French market through brokers. Country variable costs
of imports (tari⁄s and distance) have signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect on the share of
imports. The more distant the country of origin, the higher the recourse to indirect
imports. The number of documents needed to export to France is considered as
a proxy of ￿xed costs and has a signi￿cant and positive impact on brokers￿share.
Also there is no product sensitivity e⁄ect.
As for retailers, the results show that only two variables have a signi￿cant
e⁄ect. First, tari⁄s as a variable cost is positively correlated (as for brokers) with
the traders￿share of imports. We need to deepen this result to better explain the
role of tari⁄s on the respective share of brokers and traders. And ￿nally, we can
observe the sensitivity product e⁄ect. The more sensitive the product to pesticides,
the less likely the product to be imported directly by retailers.
The results concerning brokers are consistent with previous studies by Ahn
et al. (2010), Bernard et al. (2010) and Crozet et al. (2010) provided for the
export share of intermediaries. Indeed, those studies show that brokers are more
likely to operate in context when ￿xed and variable costs to trade are high. In
our setting, the higher variable and ￿xed costs of trade, the higher the share of
indirect imports through brokers. Our results for the imports reinforce the fact
that brokers are important agents in international trade and that their behaviour
need to be documented as a speci￿c category of intermediaries. However, direct
10imports (caught here through retailers) do not seem to follow the same pattern.
Retailers are sensitive to variable costs (only tari⁄s) and product sensitivity.
5 Conclusion
Using very original data, we consider the activity of trade intermediaries who im-
ports in an active way. And particularly, we shed light on the behavior of trade
intermediaries when importing food and particularly fresh fruit and vegetables in
France. To do so, we follow the de￿nition of intermediaries provided in the liter-
ature, distinguishing between two ways of importing. First, we consider brokers
that won￿ t buy products they deal with. Second, we consider retailers that would
directly purchase products for their own supply chain to be distributed to con-
sumers. Retailers are more likely to develop private standards on their own. We
assume that those intermediaries would not play the same role in trade because
of this di⁄erence in ownership of products. To stick on the recent development of
the new new international economics literature we assume that brokers would be
considered as a channel of indirect imports. They are matchmakers and imports
product in the name of a customer and they get a commission to do so. As for
retailers, they represent the direct imports channel highlighted in the literature.
We have thus established that brokers and retailers do not play the same role in
trade. Brokers act as a ￿lter for some country-product pairs to enter the market.
Especially for fruit and vegetables that come from small and distant countries.
Retailers do not follow the same pattern and are more sensitive to variable costs
(only tari⁄s) and product sensitivity to pesticides. The safer the product the
higher the share of direct imports through retailers. Further work need to be done
to better understand speci￿cities in the behaviour of brokers as economic agents
especially the link between characteristics of the brokers (as productivity or size)
and the country-product pair imported.
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